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Fig. 1: Deepfake detection in videos. The figure shows our system predic-
tions when trained only on FaceForensics++ for a fake video “in the wild” (left)
and its pristine video (right). The heatmap bar below the video indicates the
likelihood of the video being fake (red) or unmanipulated (green).
Abstract. The current spike of hyper-realistic faces artificially gener-
ated using deepfakes calls for media forensics solutions that are tailored
to video streams and work reliably with a low false alarm rate at the video
level. We present a method for deepfake detection based on a two-branch
network structure that isolates digitally manipulated faces by learning
to amplify artifacts while suppressing the high-level face content. Unlike
current methods that extract spatial frequencies as a preprocessing step,
we propose a two-branch structure: one branch propagates the original
information, while the other branch suppresses the face content yet am-
plifies multi-band frequencies using a Laplacian of Gaussian (LoG) as a
bottleneck layer. To better isolate manipulated faces, we derive a novel
cost function that, unlike regular classification, compresses the variabil-
ity of natural faces and pushes away the unrealistic facial samples in the
feature space. Our two novel components show promising results on the
FaceForensics++, Celeb-DF, and Facebook’s DFDC preview benchmarks,
when compared to prior work. We then offer a full, detailed ablation
study of our network architecture and cost function. Finally, although
the bar is still high to get very remarkable figures at a very low false alarm
rate, our study shows that we can achieve good video-level performance
when cross-testing in terms of video-level AUC.
Keywords: deepfake detection, two-branch recurrent net, loss function
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2 I. Masi et al.
1 Introduction
Visual misinformation has dramatically increased on social networks and Inter-
net [1]. Nonetheless, image manipulation is not new. Falsification of lithographs
or photographs has been used for many years to reinforce political ideas or po-
litical characters [21] or to practice censorship by erasing people from pictures.
For instance, at the beginning of the twentieth century, political dissidents were
assassinated and then erased from photographs through airbrushing during the
Great Terror period in the Soviet Union [19].
In the modern era of digital pictures, perpetrators used commercial software
and “elbow grease” to create realistic swapping of faces given a pair of still im-
ages. Although some of these results look very realistic, they involved a huge
amount of manual work (on the order of hours) using a personal computer and
an expensive raster graphics editor to produce just a single image [24]. However,
the effort required to produce face swaps diminished drastically during the last
five years. Democratized artificial intelligence (AI) made it very easy to produce
highly realistic face swaps with a few clicks, giving the ability to non-experts
to synthesize content with “Hollywood-like” effects just by simply using off-the-
shelf applications [47]. The technology was quickly developed to process videos,
transferring the identity of a subject from a source video into a target video.
Unlike manual digital editing, face swapping in videos became effective and effi-
cient, reaching hyper-realistic results, thanks to recent advances in data synthesis
using Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [20], Deep Convolutional Neural
Networks (DCNN) [35], and AutoEncoders (AE) [31]. It also became easily avail-
able to non-experts through customized applications, such as DeepFaceLab [2],
or even mobile applications, such as Zao [4].
Face swapping has been superseded by deepfakes in which the original face is
replaced with a victim’s face with the intent of showing the victim to be saying
something he/she never said. The fake video is usually very realistic so that
the viewer believes that the swapped subject is the actual acting person in the
video. Although in the beginning, deepfakes were used to entertain users, they
became popular to spread political chaos, revenge porn, and defamation. For
these reasons, the rapid sharing of deepfakes on the Internet became a threat to
society leading to a common perception that seeing is no longer believing [1].
A recent report from DeepTrace [3] explains that the rate of increase in these
fakes videos is 100% a year. Although deepfakes initially appeared in 2017 on
reddit, the report estimates that there are currently 14,678 realistic-looking yet
fake videos, while the total number available in December 2018 was only 7,964.
Given the current progress of AI and deep learning, the prediction is that this
number may skyrocket in the near future. In order to mitigate the proliferation
of manipulated videos, we propose a deep learning architecture to detect hyper-
realistic face manipulations. The paper makes the following contributions:
 A two-branch representation extractor based on densely connected lay-
ers [25] that learns to combine information from the color domain and the fre-
quency domain using a multi-scale Laplacian of Gaussian (LoG) operator [10].
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The LoG operator suppresses the image content present in the low-level feature
maps, acting as a band-pass filter to amplify artifacts.
 A novel loss function that encourages compactness of the representations
of natural faces and pushes away manipulated faces for better, wider separation
boundaries, which is different than recent methods that use binary cross-entropy
for detecting face manipulations [50,52].
 As a minor contribution, we argue that current metrics (accuracy) are
improper for this problem, mainly for being very sensitive to class imbalance
and failure to capture performance for web-scale applications. Therefore, we
follow [33,55] and report True Acceptance Rate (TAR) at low False Acceptance
Rates (FAR). Also, besides standard area under receiver operating curve (AUC),
we further propose global metrics at a low false alarm rate such as standardized
partial AUC (pAUC) [42] and our truncated Area Under the Curve (tAUC).
We optimize our method for better generalization across datasets, reaching a
good balance between bias and variance [48,59,15], i.e., performing remarkably
on same dataset used for training [50] yet transferring reasonably well across
datasets [38,14]. Similar to only few works in literature [21,52], we also use
sequential modeling for video-based detection. Our method processes sequences
of aligned faces from a video, extracts discriminative features using the backbone,
and performs recurrent modeling using bi-directional long short-term memory
(LSTM) supervised by our new loss. The entire network is trained end-to-end so
that the recurrent model back-propagates to the feature extractor. Fig. 1 shows
the predictions of our system on face videos downloaded from the web when
trained only on FaceForensics++. Our method is summarized in Fig. 2.
2 Prior Work
Face forensics datasets and evaluation. Unlike the proliferation of face
recognition datasets [26,32,29,5,22], there has been a lack of large-scale face
forensics datasets in the community for both training and evaluation. Although
face swapping can be cast as a splicing image forgery technique, and some generic
forensics sets contain facial splicing and copy-move forgeries [24], earlier specific
face manipulation detection tools [23] have been mainly evaluated on still im-
ages. Small-scale benchmarks released for deepfake detection were produced in
controlled environments, e.g., DF-TIMIT [33,34] using 32 subjects selected from
the VidTIMIT [53] database with the intent of studying the weaknesses of face
detection and recognition technology, or UADFV [36] that offers around 50 bona
fide and 50 fake videos.
Only recently, Rossler et al. proposed several versions of FaceForensics++ [50],
a medium-scale collection of manipulated videos counting a total of 1.8 million
manipulated frames using four methods: FaceSwap, DeepFakes, Face2Face [57],
and NeuralTextures [56]. The same dataset was augmented by Google Research
with another set containing deepfake videos, i.e., Google Deepfake Detection
(DFD) [16]. At the same time, Facebook and other firms joined efforts to cre-
ate a competition to detect fakes on the web, releasing a preview dataset “The
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Deepfake Detection Challenge (DFDC)” [14] along with new metrics for evalua-
tion. With the exception of [37], the interesting novel aspect is that performance
is considered at a video-level instead of frame-level, effectively evaluating mod-
els at low false alarm rate. Before [14], accuracy was the only metric used to
measure fake detection performance with a few exceptions [33,55]. Despite these
contributions, the perceived quality of the synthesized videos offered by these
sets appears still lower compared to the videos circulating on the web, thus Li
et al. recently released Celeb-DF [38] to produce hyper-realistic deepfakes, re-
porting the frame-level AUC as a metric. This benchmark is compelling, offering
5, 369 high quality videos for a total of 2.1M frames.
Detection of face manipulations. Although image forensics has been widely
studied for a long time [17], deepfakes is recent technology and thus several or-
thogonal works have been proposed lately for solving the problem of detecting
face manipulations. Methods for deepfake detection can be roughly categorized
in two macroscopic groups — (i) discriminative classifiers that use diverse se-
mantic inconsistencies of the head and face; and (ii) data-driven approaches di-
rectly learning a discriminative function from data. Considering the first group,
Agarwal et al. built person-specific classifiers [7] using one-class support vector
machines (SVM) and features computed from Action Units (AU) and 3D head
pose movements. Similarly, Li et al. [36] used the observation that initial versions
of deepfakes were not blinking. Later they extended the work to check for the
inconsistency of 3D head poses. They also trained a DCNN though they used
as negative samples faces undergoing warping artifacts to simulate the deepfake
stitching process [37], while [41] used hand-crafted visual features to amplify ar-
tifacts. Regarding the second group, XceptionNet [11] has been widely used [50],
while [6] used a variant of Inception module to capture both micro and meso-
scopic features. Han et al. [23] used a two-branch structure similar to ours, yet,
unlike our method, performed late fusion between a RGB branch and steganaly-
sis features, using triplet loss for supervision. Later methods employed multi-task
learning [44] with an encoder-decoder similar to [13] and capsule networks [45].
For a complete survey, we refer to [38,46] and the recent work in [58,61].
GAN synthesis detection. Finally, a parallel line of related research [69,68,13]
[60,40] is detecting entirely GAN-synthesized face images, e.g., using Style-
GAN [28]. Our work shares similar traits with the very recent research by Yu
et al. [68] with some major differences. We focus on detecting deepfakes, while
[68]’s interest is in modeling GAN fingerprints. More importantly, our method
is composed of a two-branch structure that fuses RGB information with the
frequency domain.
3 Method
The objective is to learn a classifier for the detection of manipulated faces, squish-
ing a set of aligned video frames1 I ∈ RH×W×3×F to an embedding Φ(I) ∈ RD
1 Throughout this paper I indicates a sequence (or window) of aligned faces from video
frames of cardinality F .
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Fig. 2: Our video-based face manipulation detection architecture. A face
sequence is processed by two independent DenseBlocks: one subject to a Deep
Laplacian of Gaussian (Deep LoG) layer (frequency enhancement) and the sec-
ond is a branch that works in the color domain. The two feature maps are fused
so that a backbone of dense blocks learns a rich representation. The architec-
ture uses dropout after each DenseLayer and a different learning rate per layer
to mitigate overfitting. Our architecture ends with a bi-directional LSTM layer
supervised using a novel loss formulation.
so that the representations of natural faces are compact around a reference cen-
troid c and manipulated faces are spread out, ensuring a large margin between
tampered and untamperd faces. In Section 3.1 we introduce a two-branch back-
bone representation extractor Φ(·) based on densely connected layers [25]. Φ
learns to fuse different representations obtained using regular convolutional fil-
ters ΦRGB and representations extracted using multi-scale Laplacian of Gaus-
sian [10] kernels ΦLoG (Section 3.2). The combined features maps are then fed to
the backbone that ends with a bi-directional Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
for temporal modeling. Φ(I) indicates the concatenated output from the two
bidirectional LSTM streams. The entire recurrent model is supervised through
a novel formulation. Unlike recent methods [50,52] that use classification losses
for detection, in Section 3.3 we introduce a loss function that encourages the
compactness of the representations of untampered faces, while distancing the
representations of manipulated faces, for wider separation boundaries. At test-
time, given an input sequence I, the method obtains the distance
∥∥Φ(I)−c∥∥
2
; the
larger the distance the higher the likelihood of the sample being manipulated.
3.1 Network Architecture and Optimization
Architecture. The basic network architecture Φ is derived by the recent work
in [52] with major modification. The network takes as input RGB faces but con-
sists of two different branches: a regular DenseBlock [25] that learns to process
color domain data ΦRGB and another parallel DenseBlock ΦLoG with unshared
weights that learns to discard visual face content by applying a Laplacian of
Gaussian (LoG) filter to the low-level feature maps. The two feature maps are
aligned and have a resolution of 28×28 with 128 planes. These maps are fused
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Fig. 3: Diverse feature maps. A diverse set of feature maps is obtained in
the two distinct branches. The three representative feature maps after the first
convolutional layer and our Deep LoG layer from ΦLoG are shown on the left
with the input. The feature maps on the right show the response from ΦRGB.
together with point-wise convolution with two groups [27] such that each group
of convolutional filters independently refines and fuses the information for the
three downstream DenseBlocks. All the DenseBlocks end with a Transitional
layer except for the one prior the LSTM. We discard the final linear classifica-
tion layer and reduce the final feature map to a feature vector with dimension
1024 using global average pooling. Dropout with a probability of 0.2 is applied
at the end of each DenseLayer to avoid overfitting.
Optimization. Instead of optimizing the entire network with a single learning
rate, which may overfit given the large parameter space of DenseNet, we employ a
strategy that sets different learning rates per DenseBlock. In particular, given the
global learning rate µ, we define a decay for the DenseBlocks so that downstream
layers incorporate gradients quickly while upstream layers change less drastically.
The learning rate decay is defined as µL
.
= µ · 1/(2L) for the entire network with
the exception of the DenseBlock of the Deep LoG and the layer in charge of
fusing the two-branches. The parameters of fusion layers are updated faster, with
the global rate µ, since that they have to be adapted to the frequency domain
information. The blue bars in Fig. 2 indicate the intensity of learning rate for each
layer. We initialize all the layers from pre-trained weights from ImageNet except
those of the LSTM, which are instead initialized from a uniform distribution.
Video-based stratified sampling. Since inter-video variations are stronger
than intra-video, we define a “stratified epoch” as the set of sequences obtained
by sampling a random sequence once from all the videos in the training set. Strat-
ified training ensures that each mini-batch includes a diversified set of training
samples, avoiding including similar sequences from the same video within the
mini-batch if we use simple random sampling.
3.2 Deep Laplacian of Gaussian
Motivation. Zhang et al. [69] show that image manipulations leave medium-
and high-frequency traces, and since most of the deepfakes methods reconstruct
a face with an average pixel-wise `2 loss (Mean Square Error (MSE)), producing
somewhat blurry (low-frequency) facial features, and because of the up-sampling
commonly used in the decoder part. According to these observations, we design a
custom layer to propagate multi-band frequency information inside the network
with the goal of suppressing high-level face content, thereby amplify artifacts.
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Implementation. Without loss of generality, given a feature map x, we apply
a Laplacian of Gaussian (LoG) [10] as follows. Input tensor x (which can be in
the first layer the input image alone or directly higher feature maps) is processed
by two sets of convolutional filters: fixed, non-learnable filters wN2D , as a 2D
Gaussian kernel and a dimensionality reduction filter w1×1 that maps back the
dimensionality to the input expected by the next layer. The layer shares a similar
design with [66] although in our case (1) the objective is to suppress global
information from the face, not to suppress noise from adversarial samples and
(2) the skip-connection is used to remove information while [66] used it to ease
the training. As described in Eq. (1), the output feature map x′ is then obtained
as shown in Eq. (1)
x′ = w1×1
(
x− up(down(wN2D x))), (1)
where up(·),down(·) indicate upsampling and downsampling, respectively, of the
tensor across multiple scales S=3. Assuming that the LoG is inserted into a layer
with K input planes and K ′ output planes, then internally the tensor depth
dimension becomes K
LoG−−−→ S K w1×1−−−→ K ′. Fig. 3 shows the difference in the
feature maps between the new LoG branch and the regular RGB branch after
the first convolutional layer. All the feature maps are taken from the same filters,
so they are aligned across branches. Each map is normalized ∈ [0, 1]. We can see
that most of the energy in the response for the ΦLoG case is around the edges,
the ΦRGB counterpart instead focuses more on the global structure of the face.
3.3 Loss Function to Isolate Manipulated Faces
Motivation. The majority of previous work on face manipulation detection
[69,50,52] uses standard cost functions adopted from classification. Cozzolino et
al. [13] recently made an effort toward representation disentanglement and gen-
eralization for face manipulation detection. Unlike previous work summarized in
Section 2, we propose a new loss for better isolating manipulated faces inspired by
recent work on one-class classifiers, such as one-class Deep Support Vector Data
Description (Deep SVDD) [51]. The new formulation induces compactness of the
embedding space for sequences of unmanipulated faces. However, unlike [51], the
proposed loss employs manipulations synthesized by a few generators as negative
samples enforcing a larger margin to the natural face sequences.
Formulation. More formally, we optimize the entire recurrent network defined
in Section 3.1 through a cost function that organizes the feature space such
that the variability of sequences of natural faces is compacted toward a refer-
ence center while the representations of manipulated face sequences are placed
far apart at the boundaries of the feature space. Before training, we begin by
pre-computing a reference center c ∈ RD by averaging the encodings of all the
natural, unmanipulated face sequences in the training set. The encodings are
obtained by taking the responses of our entire architecture with two-branches
and the bi-directional LSTM before training. The concatenated bidirectional
LSTM features are extracted using the same network that is pre-trained. The
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Fig. 4: Loss formulation. (a) The loss induces compression of the natural face
sequences within a inner hypersphere placing easier samples close to c and
tougher samples at the boundary; meanwhile it induces a large margin forcing
the manipulated face sequences outside the outer hypersphere (b) t-SNE [39]
visualization of the feature space on the test set between natural faces (yellow)
and deepfakes (violet). The center c is shown as an orange cross. (c) Genuine-
Impostor distribution of logits with binary cross-entropy and (d) with our loss
function: imposing a wider margin induces less confusion in the distribution.
two-branches and the backbone are pre-trained on ImageNet. When the train-
ing starts, all the features are aligned to this predefined embedding space. Then
we define two hyperspheres centered around c to constrain the feature space so
that natural faces lie within SD−1(c; r−), while manipulated faces are kept out-
side SD−1(c; r+). The loss induces compression on the regular faces embeddings.
However, unlike [51], we avoid reducing all samples to a single high-dimensional
point and mitigate overfitting by requiring compression up to an internal in-
ner margin defined by the radius r− of the first hypersphere. Furthermore, the
proposed loss enforces sequences of manipulated faces to be kept outside the
second hypersphere defined by the radius r+. The loss L given a mini-batch
Ω ∈ RH×W×3×F×B of face sequences is defined as shown in Eq. (2):
L = 1|Ωnat.|
∑
i∈Ωnat.
max
(
0,
∥∥Φ(Ii)− c∥∥2 − r−)+
+
1
|Ωman.|
∑
j∈Ωman.
max
(
0, r+ − ∥∥Φ(Ij)− c∥∥2), (2)
where Ωnat.,man. selects natural and manipulated face samples, respectively. For
this loss to be valid, it has to hold that 0 < r− < r+ and the margin imposed
between the two classes is m = r+−r−. The values of the two radii have to be set
according to the dimensionality D of the feature embedding. The loss mitigates
the problem of class imbalances by normalizing each term by its cardinality.
Further, the second margin r+ is essential to the loss because the network may
chose to lower the cost just by pushing the negative samples indefinitely, without
inducing compression on the natural faces.
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Fig. 4a illustrates the basic idea of the proposed loss, and Fig. 4b demon-
strates the feature space of the test set of natural faces vs deepfakes. The features
are mapped to R2 using t-SNE [39] optimizing a plain DenseNet model. Natural
faces are compressed while manipulated faces lie at the boundaries. The clusters
formed by videos are visible for the manipulated faces. Fig. 4c shows the genuine
and impostor distribution of the logits at inference time for a model trained for
discerning real faces from deepfakes using binary cross-entropy on FaceForen-
sics++ [50]. Although the distribution presents two peaks corresponding to real
and deepfakes faces, the variance of those distribution is not minimized, and,
more importantly, real face logits are spread out toward the manipulated faces
thereby negatively affecting the detection rate at a low false alarm regime. In
contrast, Fig. 4d offers the distribution of the distances from the center c for
the two classes. Using the proposed loss we achieved compression of the natural
faces and a clear separation from the manipulated faces, visible when zooming
in a highly confusing region.
Interpretation. Eq. (2) shares similar traits with the formulation in [51] with a
few key differences. First, we have a secondary term for supervision for abnormal
cases. Second, we have margins that avoid overfitting and better separate the
two classes. The loss function also resembles the classic formulations found in
deep metric learning such as contrastive loss functions [65], although in our case
the optimization is better constrained since the network is allowed to “move”
only Φ(I) while c is kept fixed. Finally, we spare the sampling of pairs or even
triplets [54] which significantly reduces training complexity. Our loss differs from
recent formulations: [64] uses softmax while we do not; it also sets one center for
each class while we have a single center for both classes; finally, unlike us, [64]
updates the centers while training. The work in [62] enforces angular margin
whereas ours uses radial distance margin; [62] induces compactness in all the
classes while ours only on natural face sequences.
4 Experimental Evaluation
Benchmarks and metrics. Ablation studies and comparisons are conducted
on (1) FaceForensics++ [50], (2) Celeb-DF [38], (3) and the Deepfake Detection
Challenge (DFDC) Preview Dataset [14]. We report results at the video-level
and also at the frame-level. Given that our method works at a sequence level,
when comparing to other methods, we made sure that the number of samples
prior computing the ROC is the same for all methods when comparing at the
frame-level or, at least, that that all methods observed the same quantity of
data. Further, we use standard metrics such as True Acceptance Rate (TAR)
at low False Acceptance Rates (FAR), similar to [33,55]. Besides standard area
under receiver operating curve (AUC), we further use global metrics yet at a low
false alarm rate such. These metrics can shed light on performance in realistic
operational scenarios, thereby requiring detectors to operate at a very low false
alarm rate and raising the bar for the community. We used the standardized
partial AUC or pAUC [42] and our tAUC, that is defined as AUC yet taking
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into consideration only the low false alarm rate up to a cut-off point FARτ ,
thereby ignoring high false alarm rates. tAUC is computed as the ratio between
the area of TARs up to a given low FARτ normalized by the total area up to
the FARτ value. Given Fτ = {0, . . . ,FARτ}, then tAUC at an operating point
τ is defined as tAUCτ
.
=
∑
i∈Fτ TARi
|Fτ | .
Implementation and Hyper-Parameters. Unless otherwise stated, we used
the following settings. The global learning rate µ is 1e-03 using the Adam opti-
mizer and the results are produced with LSTM. The learning rate is decreased
three times by a factor of 10. We decrease it every time the validation loss does
not decrease after 50 stratified epochs. We used a weight decay of 1e-06. The final
global average pooling flattening the spatial dimension gives a descriptor with
dimensionality 1024 transformed into D=128 by the LSTM. The final dimen-
sionality considered in the loss is 2D2 and the two radii r{−,+} .= {0. 042, 1. 638}
have to be optimized together and cross-validated on a validation set. In high-
dimensional space, the volume of the hyper-sphere decreases when the feature
descriptor dimension D increases [63]: thus, if D does change, the radii have
to be changed accordingly. By increasing the dimensionality D of the final fea-
ture, the radii have to be increased as well to compensate for the diminished
hyper-volume of the hyper-sphere. The cardinality F of the sequence of aligned
frames as input to the recurrent model is 10. Since the sequential modeling is
trained on sampled FF++ data, at inference time we take 1 frame over 7 to build
the sequence. Faces are aligned with dlib [30]. If alignment fails, we revert back
to [9]. In case of multiple detected faces, we select the largest detected face.
Since FaceForensics++ has imbalanced labels (1:4), we oversample the natural
faces twice and undersample randomly faces for each manipulation with a factor
of two to get a proper balance, when training with multiple manipulations. We
used average to perform video-level evaluation to aggregate all the scores within
a video for all methods. When doing cross-testing, we use always the same model
trained on FF++ on the four manipulations on high compression (c40).
4.1 FaceForensics++ (FF++)
Settings. When training and evaluating on FF++, we follow the sampling strat-
egy mentioned in [50] that selects 270 frames/video for the training and 110
frames/video for validation and testing. We evaluated both medium compres-
sion (c23) and high compression levels (c40) subsets.
Ablation study, c40. Table 1a shows the ablation study for different build-
ing blocks of the proposed pipeline, along with the proposed loss function.
These results are reported without the LSTM thereby evaluating only the back-
bone without stratified sampling. Given that D=1024, the two radii are set
r{−,+} .= {2. 5, 97. 5}. We report metrics such as TAR and tAUC at a given
FAR value. The cut-off FAR points considered are 1% and 10%. At the top, we
2 The dimensionality is doubled since the results of the bi-directional streams are
concatenated.
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Deepfakes c40 - wo/ LSTM
tAUC1% tAUC10% TAR1%
Encoder [52] 57.63 86.61 81.50
+ft,+drop,+loss 76.04 89.91 92.84
(a)
Deepfakes c23 - wo/ LSTM
tAUC1% tAUC10% TAR1%
Single-Branch 56.78 61.14 99.34
Two-Branch 61.70 70.80 98.34
(b)
Deepfakes c40 - w/ LSTM
LSTM LSTM ΦRGB f.t. tAUC1% TAR1%
hid. nodes fusion ◦ ΦLoG +dropout
128 cat conv1x1g=1 — 57.21 83.33
128 cat conv1x1g=1 X 73.58 87.38
128 sum conv1x1g=2 X 67.49 83.81
256 cat conv1x1g=2 X 76.35 87.14
128 cat conv1x1g=2 X 81.53 92.54
(c)
Table 1: Ablation study on FF++. (a) Testing metrics obtained by training our
model under different settings on the FF++ [50] under the highest compression
level c40 without LSTM, ablating our optimization and the loss function. (b)
Ablation experiments showing the impact of the two branches under the medium
compression level c23. (c) Ablation experiments using LSTM on c40.
HQ (c23) LQ (c40)
Frame Video Frame Video
Level (∼70K samples) Level (700 samples) Level (∼70K samples) Level (700 samples)
Methods AUC pAUC10% tAUC10% TAR10% AUC pAUC10% tAUC10% TAR10% AUC pAUC10% tAUC10% TAR10% AUC pAUC10% tAUC10% TAR10%
DSP-FWA [37] 56.89 51.33 7.47 14.60 57.49 51.59 7.48 15.00 59.15 52.04 8.82 17.30 62.34 51.93 9.82 22.14
Xception [50] 92.30 87.71 73.34 81.21 92.50 89.20 58.21 82.85 83.93 74.78 45.92 63.25 86.75 79.10 39.06 68.75
Ours 98.70 97.43 65.29 97.95 99.12 98.41 86.10 98.21 86.59 69.71 40.41 62.48 91.10 76.57 51.18 72.85
Table 2: Frame-level and Video-level comparison on FF++. Multiple met-
rics reported for medium compression (c23) and high compression (c40) on
FF++ comparing our method with XceptionNet [50] and DSP-FWA [37]. Re-
sults are reported on four manipulations.
report results from [52] re-implementing the method without sequential mod-
eling, thereby using just the DenseNet encoder. All methods evaluated in this
table consider only the ΦRGB stream and are trained with a global learning rate
of 1e-04. Although [52] reaches compelling result at tAUC10%, the performance
degrades at lower FAR. Better performance is obtained by combining minor
improvements such as training the network with the optimization mentioned
in Section 3.1 that assigns a different updating rate per layer (+ft) and dropout
(+drop) and by using our new loss function (+loss) proposed in Section 3.3.
The gain at low false alarm rate is substantial compared to [52] that was trained
with binary cross-entropy. In particular, the loss manages to push tAUC1% up
from 57% to 76% by imposing a large margin—see Fig. 4d—while the regular
cross-entropy overfits quickly.
Ablation study, c23. Given the best results obtained in the previous exper-
iment (i.e., +ft,+drop,+loss), we use this configuration as a new baseline to
perform other ablations using the FF++ part with medium compression (c23).
Table 1b reports experiments showing the difference between a single branch
and the two-branch structure.
Ablation study using LSTM, c40. Table 1c shows the ablation experiments
when testing the recurrent model. Since adding a recurrent modeling is a drastic
change, we verified again that our optimization strategy with different updating
rates per layer holds in this case as well. The first two rows in the table support
this hypothesis. We further investigate how to fuse the bi-directional outputs
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Frame Video
Level Level
Methods AUC pAUC10% tAUC10% TAR10% AUC pAUC10% tAUC10% TAR10%
Xception-c40 [50] 65.86 54.49 12.23 22.97 69.70 57.18 16.85 34.70
DSP-FWA [37] 64.13 52.87 10.18 19.67 69.30 51.40 17.20 32.02
Xception-c23 [50] 66.65 53.05 10.21 19.83 73.04 52.77 9.45 18.82
Ours 73.41 57.42 18.18 32.22 76.65 58.70 19.73 39.70
(a)
Method FF++ [50] Celeb-DF [38]
Two-stream [23] 70.1 53.8
Meso4 [6] 84.7 54.8
MesoInception4 83.0 53.6
HeadPose [67] 47.3 54.6
FWA [37] 80.1 56.9
VA-MLP [41] 66.4 55.0
VA-LogReg 78.0 55.1
Xception-raw [50] 99.7 48.2
Xception-c23 99.7 65.3
Xception-c40 95.5 65.5
Multi-task [44] 76.3 54.3
Capsule [45] 96.6 57.5
DSP-FWA [37] 93.0 64.6
Ours 93.18 73.41
(b)
Table 3: Cross-dataset evaluation on Celeb-DF. (a) Frame- and video-
level performance yet computed at a very low false alarm rate. Best competing
methods on Celeb-DF are reported. Ours obtains a wide margin in all the low
false alarm rate metrics (b) still performs well when tested on just deepfake class
(93.18 %) AUC on FF++. Results for other methods are from [38].
from LSTM and optimize its hidden nodes. Our best result is obtained using
hidden node size of 128 and concatenating the two bi-directional outputs. Fur-
thermore, when fusing the two branches ΦRGB◦ ΦLoG having convolutional filters
divided in two groups is beneficial to the performance.
Results. Table 2 shows a thorough comparison on FF++ [50] training and test-
ing with four manipulations types (Deepfakes, FaceSwap, Face2Face, and Neu-
ralTextures) along with the natural faces. Following [50], we trained a model for
c23 and another for c40. The table offers multiple evaluations metrics such as
AUC, pAUC10%, tAUC10% and TAR10%. In general, our approach has superior
performance compared to Xception. In particular, we improved almost all frame-
level performance for the medium compression case (c23), pushing the video-level
AUC from 92% to 99%. The result is consistent for the other compression level
but in general results are lower due to the low image quality; nevertheless our
system improves video-level AUC from 86% to 91% along with other low false
alarm video-level metrics. The table also reports the result of a self-supervised
method DSP-FWA [37]. Table 4a further shows the binary classification accura-
cies for several state-of-the-art face manipulation detection methods computed
on FF++ [50]. Our approach scores the highest accuracies across manipulations
for all the compression levels when trained on the four manipulations. It should
be noted that a classifier exploiting the class imbalance here can get an accuracy
of 80% by simply predicting all samples as fakes given that we have 140 real and
560 fake videos or similar balance at the frame level.
4.2 Celeb-DF
Results. We evaluate how well our model transfers to Celeb-DF given that
it is trained on FF++ with multiple manipulations. We do this with the goal
of confirming that we optimized our method for better generalization across
datasets, reaching a good balance between bias and variance. Table 3a shows a
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(a) Natural Sequences (b) Manipulated Sequences
Fig. 5: Qualitative analysis on Celeb-DF. The color indicates correct classi-
fication (green) or misclassification (red).
state-of-the-art evaluation at the frame- and video-level on the 518 test video
of Celeb-DF, comparing it to other recent methods. Like other methods [50],
we trained the model on FF++ to discern real faces versus four manipulation
types at the c40 compression level. Table 3a reports a clear net improvement
over the state-of-the-art, even when compared with recent methods that trained
the model with self-supervision thereby, in theory, being less prone to overfitting,
such as DSP-FWA [37]. Table 3b offers instead the classic evaluation performance
in terms of AUC comparing our approach to the very recent method for digital
face manipulation detection. We obtained higher AUC when compared to all the
other methods on Celeb-DF while keeping an high AUC on FF++ on Deepfakes.
Qualitative analysis. Fig. 5 shows a qualitative analysis performed on the chal-
lenging Celeb-DF [38]. Fig. 5a shows untampered faces. The method correctly
classifies a sequence with good quality although we used FF++ with high com-
pression level (c40) for training. Failure case for the natural faces may be caused
by the poor illumination. Fig. 5b shows manipulated faces and the method was
able to detect a challenging sequence that could be perceived “as real”; the other
failure may be due to the presence of strong facial hairs which could be absent
in training data.
4.3 The Deepfake Detection Challenge (DFDC) Preview Dataset
We report video-level results on the “The Deepfake Detection Challenge (DFDC)
preview set” using the evaluation described in [14]. This dataset contains approx-
imately 5,250 videos of digitally manipulated and bona fide videos. As in [14],
we used part of the training for cross validation for the two parameters avail-
able in our approach that are the optimal number of sequences and the distance∥∥Φ(I)−c∥∥
2
. We implemented five-fold cross-validation (20% of training retained
for validation) and selected the best pair of parameters across the folds required
to maximize the log-weighted precision, log(wP), with α=100, maintaining the
desired level of recall. This procedure was repeated for different cutoff recalls
(R10%, R50%, R90%). Although cross validation procedure aims to optimize the
two parameters to keep a desired level of recall, meeting the same level of recall is
not guaranteed when evaluating on the test set. This procedure simulates what
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can happen in real scenarios in which a system can be optimized on a valida-
tion set and then simply tested in the wild over millions of unlabeled data. For
this reason, we report log(wP)@recall on the best validation fold under “valid”
and the test set with “test-from-valid” using the parameters from validation.
Alternatively, we also searched for the best log(wP) to exactly match the recall
value on the test set and report those values under “test”. Except for the above
parameter selection, our method has not been re-trained on DFDC preview.
Results. Table 4b shows the evaluation results at the video level. Considering
our results under “test,” our method has slightly worse precision than Xcep-
tionNet [50] at R10%. However, if we optimize for high recall (R90%), we obtain
a substantial boost in the log(wP), increasing log(wP) from -4.041 to -3.548.
Moreover, we notice the following if we evaluate with the best hyper-parameters
selected on the validation set our method maintains log(wP) better than other
methods (-3.721) with a good recall of 0.943.
Methods HQ (c23) LQ (c40)
[50] XceptionNet (Full Image) 74.78 70.52
[18] Steg. Features + SVM 70.97 55.98
[12] Cozzolino et al. 78.45 58.69
[8] Bayar and Stamm 82.97 66.84
[49] Rahmouni et al. 79.08 61.18
[6] MesoNet 83.10 70.47
[50] XceptionNet 95.73 81.00
Ours 96.43 86.34
(a)
Method R10% R50% R90%
TamperNet [14] -2.796@— -3.864@— -4.041@—
XceptionNet [50] (Face) -1.999@— -3.012@— -4.081@—
XceptionNet [50] (Full) -3.293@— -3.835@— -4.081@—
Ours (test) -2.564@0.100 -3.152@0.501 -3.548@0.901
Ours (valid) -2.311@0.090 -2.481@0.523 -2.678@0.918
Ours (test-from-valid) -3.386@0.042 -3.433@0.440 -3.721@0.943
(b)
Table 4: FF++ Accuracies and DFDC Preview Dataset. (a) Comparison
of accuracies on FF++ (b) Video-level log(wP) for various recall rates.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a method for video-based deepfake detection that uses a recurrent
model to process sequences of aligned faces using a two-branch backbone with a
loss function to isolate manipulated face sequences. We have shown results that
outperform or are on par with state-of-the-art. However, for practical, web-scale
applications, there is significant room for improvement at low false alarm rates.
In the short term, we plan to measure the impact of data augmentation and
the usage of additional external natural faces [43]. In the long term, we plan to
augment our model with an explainability mechanism that does not need any
pixel-wise supervision for face manipulations.
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